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Honorable Lewis Jones, District Judge 
L. E. NELSON, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
A. H. HODGES, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
EV ANDER L. WAITE, also known as 
E. L. WAITE 
Defendant and Appellant 
CASE NO. 8018 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This action was filed in the District Court of Cache 
County, by the plaip.tiff to recover damages from defend-
ant as a result of a collision between the plaintiff's truck 
and defendant's pickup truck and trailer, which occurred 
on October 20, 1951, in Logan Canyon. A trial before 
a jury resulted in a verdict in plaintiff's favor for $309.75 
upon which judgment was entered by the trial court. The 
defendant filed a motion for judgment nothwithstanding 
the verdict, or in the alternative a motion for a new trial, 
which was denied on April13, 1953. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This statement of facts is made for a more complete 
understanding of the material facts omitted in appellant's 
brief. 
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The plaintiff, a resident of Smithfield, has been en-
gaged in the trucking business since 1933, hauling flour, 
mill feed and grain from Malad, Idaho, to towns in West-
ern Wyoming via, Logan Canyon. On October 20, 1951, 
plaintiff was returning through Logan Canyon from one of 
his regular trips, and about 6:30p.m., and after dark, he 
reached a point known as Temple Fork, about 17 miles 
from Logan, and as he proceeded around a curve on the 
highway he saw the defendant's horse and trailer about 
40 or 50 feet ahead of him in the right hand lane of traffic. 
( R. 41, 76). Plaintiff immediately applied the brakes on 
his truck and swerved to the left in an attempt to avoid 
a collision, but time and space would not permit, and 
he collided with the left rear end of the defendant's trailer 
and truck. ( R. 41, 78). 
It was after dark and the defendant had stopped his 
pickup truck and a cattle trailer attached thereto in the 
right lane of traffic facing south on a curve in the highway 
for the purpose of loading a horse in the trailer. ( R. 137). 
The defendant had failed to post warning signals of any 
kind to warn motorists that he had stopped his truck on 
the highway at the place of the collision. ( R. 45). At the 
time of the collision the defendant was loading the horse 
in the trailer, and he jumped to the East to avoid being 
struck. His son Jean was sitting in the seat behind the 
wheel. After the collision both cars moved forward about 
70 feet. (R 44, 45). When the cars stopped he and 
plaintiff descended from their respective vehicles and 
the defendant came down and joined them. ( R. 45). 
The plaintiff said to both of them, "What were you 
doing parked here?" And they replied, "We were loading 
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a horse and we'd have been gone in just a minute. If we 
had had another few seconds we would have been out of 
your way." Plaintiff testified that immediately after the 
accident he posted flares on the highway about 100 feet 
above the curve to warn approaching traffic of the pres-
ence of the vehicles standing on the curve. ( R. 54 ) . 
William A. Noble was called as a witness by plaintiff. 
(R. 114). His deposition was taken on January 18, 1953, 
( R. 114, 200) and admitted and read in evidence at trial 
(R. 114). He and Lynn Hillyard were hunting deer 
and were camped along the highway, a short distance 
below the place where the collision occurred. They heard 
the impact and came immediately to the place of the col-
lision. (Tr. 201-204). He testified that it was after dark 
when the accident occurred. The trucks were inter-locked 
and facing down the canyon. 
Upon further examination he testified: 
Q. Do you know whether this accident occurred on a 
straightaway or on a curve? A. It happned just around 
the turn. Q. Around the curve? A. As near as I can re-
member. In other words, Alden's truck wouldn't have 
seen the vehicle parked there until he had come almost 
around the turn, giving him not much distance between 
the two. Q. Now which lane of traffic were the vehicles 
standing in? A. When I saw them they were both in the 
right lane. ( R. 204). 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The verdict and judgment entered thereon 
are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 
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The testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses dis-
closed that the collision occurred on a curve in the high-
way) and defendant had parked his truck and trailer in 
the right lane of traffic on a curve on the highway after 
clark without posting flares or any light on the highway 
to warn approaching traffic of the presence of his vehicles 
on the highway. (R. 41, 45, 76). 
The plaintiff testified that the accident occurred on a 
curve and his testimony was corroborated by the testimony 
of Highway Patrolman, Ed Pitcher, ( R. 101) who investi-
gated the accident, and William A. Noble, who arrived 
on the scene shortly after it occurred, and he testified that 
the collision occurred "around the turn." ( R. 204). 
The defendant and his son Jean attempted to show 
that the accident occurred on the staightaway above the 
curve, but just where thereon was not definitely fixed. If 
this were true, then how did the vehicles stop 135 feet 
south of the junction of the Temple Fork road, which 
enters the main highway at the beginning of the curve? 
Officer Pitcher testified to that. His measurement fixed 
the location of both vehicles at 135 feet south of the 
Temple Fork road and they were facing south. ( R. 101). 
The jury,. no doubt, found and concluded that the 
accident occurred on the curve as plaintiff and witness 
Noble testified, ( 41, 76, 204) and also found that no 
warning signals were posted by defendant. to warn the 
plaintiff and other motorists of the presence of his vehicle 
upon the highway. 
Section 57-7-191, (b) Laws 1949, in force at that 
time required defendant to display a red light visible from 
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a distance of 500 feet to the rear. The substance of this 
statute was given to the jury in instruction No. 4, 
Point 2. Defendant's requested Instruction No. 5, 
was properly denied. 
It is submitted that defendant's request No.5, ( R. 11) 
was properly denied by the Court. By the terms of this 
request the jury would have been instructed to return a 
verdict in favor of the defendant. In effect, defendant 
was asking the court to completely ignore the testimony 
of plaintiff and his witnesses. The Court did by its in-
structions fully instruct the jury on defendants theory as 
reflected by the testimony of the defendant and his wit-
nesses. (R. 7-10, 13, 14, 16). 
Point 3. The Court properly denied defendant's mo-
tion for Judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the 
alternative motion for new trial. 
Defendant contends that evidence produced by plain-
tiff established as a matter of law that plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. 
The trial court by its instruction number one submitted 
this question to the jury. "Was the plaintiff negligent?" 
The jury answered. "No." It is difficult to perceive how 
defendant can make such a contention in view of the 
positive answer of the jury. The instructions of the court 
covered these issues, instruction 5 and 6. ( R. 16). So 
that, the verdict of the jury based upon proper instructions 
by the court, and on conflicting testimony is conclusive 
upon defendant. 
Appellant relies upon the following cases: Nikolero-
poulos vs. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465, 214 P. 304; Dalley vs. 
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Midwestern Dairy Produce Co., 80 Utah 331, 15. P 2d. 
300; Wright vs. Maynard, 235 P. 2d. 916, Pollard vs. Whit-
man 183 P. 2d. 175. 
Nikoleropolous vs. Ramsey, 214 P. 304, is not in point 
on the facts. At the time of and immediately prior to the 
accident in that case, plaintiff was walking along the ex-
treme right side of the paved highway. At that place 
there was no sidewalks. The defendant's automobile ap-
proached plaintiff from the rear. It was raining, clear 
vision was obscured. Defendant saw plaintiff when about 
6 feet away, bul made no attempt to avoid the accident. 
The plaintiff was lawfully on the highway. So the question 
of contributory negligence was not under consideration. 
The sole question devolved upon whether defendant was 
negligent. This court held that he was. 
In Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Company, 
15 P. 2d. 309, the alleged accident occurred at night on a 
straight level highway. The defendant's truck was parked 
partially on highway and shoulder. It was an ordinary 
summer night, and the weather was clear. There was 
nothing to obstruct the driver's view as he approached the 
truck The truck was not standing upon a curve. 
The case of Wright vs. Maynard, (Utah) 235 P. 2d. 
916, does not support defendant's contentions. At the 
conclusion of the trial in that case on motion of plaintiff 
the trial court directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff and 
against the defendant, thus holding as a matter of law that 
defendant Maynard's alleged negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident, and instructed the jury to re-
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turn a verdict for the plaintiff. In the instant case, the 
trial court submitted the case to the jury on both the 
question of proximate cause and whether plaintiff was 
guilty of negligence, and the jury found in favor of plain-
tiff on both propositions. 
The citation to Shimizer vs. Kurtz 11 P. 2d. 1, is an 
error, since the case is not reported in 11 P. 2d. 
The facts and issues in the case of Pollard vs. Whitman 
183 P 2d. 175, (Wash.) are entirely different from the 
facts in the case at bar. The accident occurred at night 
on a street in the city of Seattle. The defendant admitted 
negligence but charged plaintiff with contributory negli-
gence. The trial court ruled that he was free from negli-
gence and directed the jury to return a verdict for plaintiff 
and determine the amount of damages. On appeal the 
judgment was reversed and new trial granted, for the 
reason that the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence 
should have been submitted to the jury. 
It is respectfully submitted that after the trial court 
had submitted the issue between the parties to the jury 
for their determination of the facts under proper instruc-
tions, that the verdict of the jury and judgment entered 
thereon should stand. 
In the case of Maragake's vs. United States, 172 F. 2d. 
393, the Court in the course of the opinion observed that -
"The later Utah cases have rationalized the rule 
to allow an area of discretion under conditions" sud-
denly and un-expectedly" arising within the clear 
vision ahead, which with the exercise of due care the 
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driver could not have avoided the collision. Trimble 
vs. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 P. 2d. 674. 
See also West vs. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300, 
17 P. 2d. 292; Nielsen vs. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401, 
62 P. 2d. 117; Moss vs. Christensen-Gardner~ Inc., 98 
Utah 253, 98 P. 2d. 363. The Trimble case, supra, 
clarifies the rule by pointing out the various circum-
tances under which the negligence of a driver of an 
automobile, charged with this standard of care, is a 
question of fact and not of law." 
The foregoing statement of law- as laid down in the 
Trimble case, certainly is applicable to the situation which 
suddenly confronted plaintiff when he first saw defend-
ant's truck and trailer immediately in front of him on the 
curve. Plaintiff's testimony is undisputed that he immed-
iately turned his truck to the left to avoid the collision. 
This was a question of fact and the jury had a right to, and 
did, believe his testimony. 
The following Utah cases have held that the rule 
requiring a motorist to drive at such speed that the auto-
mobile may be stopped within the distance at which the 
driver of the same is able to see objects upon the highway 
in front of him - is a rule with some limitations and re-
strictions. 
Moss vs. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 98 P 2d. 365; 
Nielsen vs. Watanabe, 62 P. 2d. 117, Trimble vs. Union 
Pacific, 142 P 2d. 67 4. 
In the Moss case the facts are very similar to the case 
at bar, and the rule there stateecl is applicable to the situa-
tion confronting the plaintiff as he proceeded around the 
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curve in the instant case. ~lr. Justice :McDonough who 
wrote the opinion, stated the rule which we contend is 
applicable to the instant case in the following language: 
"The complaint here questioned is silent as to 
whether the highway near where the truck was parked 
is straight or crooked, level, or otherwise. If the truck 
could not, because of some obstruction, be seen as 
plaintiff and her husband approached it prior to the 
time they were blinded, and if plaintiff's husband was 
driving at a lawful rate of speed an automobile pro-
perly equipped with lights and brakes without any 
reason to believe the headlights of another automobile 
would suddenly or unexpectedly blind him, that while 
so blinded the collision occurred without time for hin1 
to reduce his speed or stop his automobile, the rule 
announced in the cases relied upon by defendant and 
heretofore cited in this opinion would not apply. 
Under such circumstances it may not be said that 
plaintiff's husband was, as a matter of law, guilty of 
contributory negligence." 
In the Nielsen case, supra, the rule applied in the Moss 
case, was followed and re-applied to the factual situation 
confronting Mr. and Mrs. Neilsen immediately prior to 
the collision of their car with the Watanabe truck which 
was stopped on the highway. In that case this Court held 
that Nielsen was not guilty of contributory negligence as 
a matter of law: 
"If the truck could not, because of some obstruc-
tion be seen as plaintiff and her husband approached 
it prior to the time they were blinded, and if plaintiff's 
husband was driving at a lawful rate of speed an auto-
mobile properly equipped with lights and brakes 
without any reason to believe the headlights of another 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
automobile would suddenly or unexpectedly blind 
him, that while so blinded the collision occurred with-
out time for him to reduce his speed or stop his auto-
mobile, the rule announced in the cases relied upon 
by defendant and heretofore cited in this opinion 
would not apply. Under such circumstances it may 
not be said that plaintiff's husband was, as a matter 
of law, guilty of contributory negligence. 3-4 Huddy 
Cyclopedia of Automobile Law (9th Ed. ) p. 59, sec. 
30 and cases there cited." 
The language of Mr. Justice Larson in the Trimble 
case, supra, is definitely applicable to the factual situation 
confronting plaintiff in the instant case immediately prior 
to the collision: 
.. Appellant argues that since defendant's bus 
was moving at such a speed after entering the fog that 
it could not be stopped within the driver's range of 
vision, the driver, and his principles, the defendants 
were guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Thus in 
effect appellants ask this court to say that one driving 
on a highway at night is bound to anticipate that there 
will be fog, smoke, or some other obstruction which 
will reduce the driver's vision, and that therefore all 
must drive at such speed that should they meet with 
such an obstruction they can stop their automobile 
within the range of their vision as it is limited by this 
obstruction. We do not believe this to be the correct 
rule of law, or the situation to which the rule laid 
down in the Dalley case, supra, was intended to 
apply." 
Respondent earnestly contends that the doctrine an-
nounced in the foregoing cases is determinative of the 
issues involved in the case at bar. It is respectfully sub-
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mitted that the trial courts verdict and judgment entered 
thereon is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, 
and proper instructions, and is entitled to be affirmed, 
together with respondent's costs herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. NELSON, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
